I review empirical research into the economic impact of copyright law. A key difficulty is that there is little systematic measurement of creative output and copying: there are only fragmentary statistics for the various industries. Studies of U.S. copyright registrations provide conflicting results: one shows that small changes in fees have large impacts on renewals, while another shows that many movies and books have long lives. All but one studies find that music piracy -whether conventional or digital -has hurt legitimate CD sales. Studies of extensions of copyright duration yield conflicting results: one focusing on U.S. registrations finds no effect, while a multi-country study finds that extensions are associated with substantial increases in movie production. I conclude with directions for future empirical research. National University of Singapore and IP Academy of Singapore; tel: +65 6516-6807;
Introduction
Copyright law involves a fundamental trade-off between incentives for creators of new work against the benefits from use of existing work for final consumption and as inputs into further creative activity.
"Copyright protection … trades off the costs of limiting access to a work against the benefits of providing incentives to create the work in the first place. Striking the correct balance between access and incentives is the central problem in copyright law." (Landes and Posner 1989) .
In this trade-off, the "access" to existing work includes use by consumers as well as use by creators of derivative or incremental works. Both research and development and creative activity may be cumulative in the sense that they build on earlier discoveries and creations.
In assessing the trade-off, it is important to consider that copyright law provides protection on three dimensions (Watt 2004 ): (i) duration -the length of time for which copyright is in force; (ii) depth -which aspects of the creation are protected (generally, copyright law protects the expression but not the idea); and (iii) breadth -the limits of "fair use", the rights to derivative works, and limits on rental and re-sale. It is also important to consider the costs of tracing and transacting with the copyright owner (Landes and Posner 1989) .
There has been a substantial volume of theoretical research into copyright. This has pointed to many empirical issues surrounding the fundamental trade-off. 1 However, there has been relatively little empirical research, hence major questions remain open.
o "In the formation of copyright policy, the lack of empirical data and the inability to quantify important variables … preclude precise evaluation of the impact of any significant changes in the degree of copyright protection" (Bard and Kurlantzick (1999) 
page 3).
o "Perhaps the most pressing area in which the economics of copyright is lacking is in serious empirical studies" (Watt 2004 ).
In this review, I shall first discuss the barriers to empirical research, then the results of the limited empirical research so far published, and finally, directions for future work.
The discussion is organized around three issues:
(i) How to measure creative output and copying;
(ii) How do changes in copyright law (duration, depth, and breadth) affect the expected earnings of creators of new work?
(iii)What is the creators' elasticity of supply of new work?
Measurement
The first issue is very basic, viz., the availability of the relevant data, and in particular, data regarding the creation of copyrightable items. The limited availability of such information may well be the single most important reason for the dearth of empirical research into copyright.
The "production" of a copyrightable item has two dimensions -one is the number of different titles, while the other is the volume of each title. The distinction between the two dimensions is important for two reasons. One, production of copyrightable items is subject to a high "first copy cost" relative to the marginal cost of subsequent units. Two, consumers value variety -another copy of the same movie seldom provides as much benefit as a different title. To avoid confusion, I shall use the terms "creation", "publication", and "creative activity" rather than "production".
A subtler issue is that creative activity itself has two dimensions -one is the number of titles, and the other is the quality of each title. Generally, there is no data on the quality of creative activity, so I shall focus on the data available for the number of titles. As with creative activity generally, empirical research into copying depends on reliable measures. By contrast with measurement of the creative activity itself, there is much more public attention to measurement of piracy. (For the purposes of this review, any unauthorized copying is considered to be "piracy".) Most prominently, the BSA publishes an annual report on piracy of business software with statistics for 97 countries and territories, and the IFPI publishes an annual report on piracy of recorded music with statistics for 73 countries and territories.
Owing to the public policy interest, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) have initiated projects to develop methodologies for measurement of piracy (Olsen 2005) . The WIPO project focuses on measurement of copyright piracy (Hui and Png 2005) . Hopefully, these efforts will yield internationally-accepted methodologies, that various countries will implement and so produce reliable national statistics on piracy. Plant (1934) observed that, for most of the 19 th century, U.S. copyright law did not provide any protection to British authors, yet British authors received substantial income from U.S.
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publishers. Remarkably, following Plant's (1934) seminal contribution, almost 70 years elapsed before any further research into the impact of copyright on creators' earnings.
Under U.S. law, registration of copyright is not mandatory. However, the law provides an incentive for registration, as the owner must register (or, under the 1976 Copyright Act, apply to register) before the infringement (or within three months of first publication) if the owner seeks statutory damages and attorney fees.
A historical study of registrations with the U.S. Copyright Office provides evidence that the expected value of copyright protection is very low (Landes and Posner 2003) .
During the period 1910-2000, the registration fee increased several times. Although the fee was quite low (an average of $20.48 in 2000 dollars over the period), the demand for registrations was price sensitive. Specifically, the elasticity of registrations with respect to the fee ranged from -0.20 (± 0.93) to -0.24 (± 1.34). This price sensitivity to even low registration fees suggests that the present value of the future earnings from the copyrighted item was quite small. Baker and Cunningham (2006) conducted an event study of changes in U.S.
copyright law on the stock-market value of companies in copyright-related industries between 1986-98. 3 They considered both case and statutory law, and found that increases in copyright protection were associated with an average US$4 -8.4 million increase in the market value of these companies. Note, however, that the increase in stock-market value tends to over-state the impact of legal changes on the earnings from a given set of creative activity. The reason is that any increase in market value reflects the increased profit from existing creative work and future infra-marginal creations, as well as the increase in expected profit arising from marginal future creations stimulated by the increased copyright protection.
Next, I review studies that focused on the impact of particular dimensions of copyright law on creators' earnings.
Duration. Rappaport (1998) Generally, the renewal rate increased from a low of 3% in 1914 to a high of 22% in 1991, and the renewal rate was highest for music, middling for books, and lowest for graphic-arts works. Assuming that works were not renewed because the expected future earnings fell below the cost of renewal ($10 plus the time and effort), Landes and Posner (2003) concluded that almost 80% of copyrighted works had little economic value after the initial term.
By contrast, (Liebowitz and Margolis 2005) studied a sample of 236 titles reviewed
by Book Review Digest in the 1920s. Fifty-eight years later, 41% were still in print.
In assessing the value of copyright protection, it is important to note that, at the point in time where the creator incurs the cost of creative effort, she will not know whether her work will turn into a blockbuster. Hence, copyright, copyright registration, and most importantly, renewal of copyright registration should be valued as real options rather than absolute amounts.
Depth. So far as I am aware, there has been no empirical research into the impact of changes in the depth of copyright protection on creator's earnings.
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Breadth. The overwhelming bulk of empirical research into copyright has focused on the impact of the breadth of copyright on creators' earnings, and specifically, the impact of copying. Illegal copying is also called "piracy". An issue of particular interest is the effect of advances in information and communications technology on copying and the creator's earnings.
In principle, copying could affect creators' earnings positively or negatively.
Positive effects include advertising, sampling, and sharing, all of which would stimulate 5 In the case of Baker v. Selden (101 U.S. 99, 1879), Selden published a book describing a new book-keeping system which included sample forms. Baker modified and sold the forms, and was held not to have infringed Selden's copyright. Landes and Posner (1989) explain that the court was correct to limit the depth of copyright protection, as there are limited ways to express the idea of the book-keeping system. Allowing copyright over the forms (an expression) would have essentially provided copyright over the book-keeping system (the idea).
demand for the legitimate item. The obvious negative effect is the direct substitution of pirated for the legitimate item.
A key innovation in the technology of copying was the photocopying machine. How did that affect the earnings of creators? Liebowitz (1985) observed that, following the widespread adoption of photocopying machines, journal publishers raised subscription rates to libraries relative to rates for individuals. Further, the differential was highest for the most frequently copied journals. By charging discriminatory rates, the publishers could "indirectly appropriate" some of the libraries' benefit from copying.
With regard to piracy, Hui and Png (2003) While Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2005) found that file-sharing had no impact on music CD sales, all of the other studies concluded that file-sharing caused music CD sales to fall (Liebowitz 2006) . 8 See the Table. -- Table about Another aspect to the breadth of copyright protection is the extent to which the seller of a copyrighted item can control the buyer's commercial use, and specifically, rental and re-sale. In the United States, by the "first sale doctrine", movie studios cannot restrict buyers of pre-recorded videotapes from renting to others. Accordingly, studios have only two choices of pricing -uniform pricing, or indirect discrimination by initially pricing high to capture surplus from video rental stores and then cutting price for "sell through". In the European Union, however, studios can directly discriminate -charging stores different prices for videotapes for rental and for sell through.
Mortimer (2005) estimated the retail demand for rental vis-a-vis sell through videotapes and DVDs, and calculated that direct discrimination would benefit studios and consumers at the expense of retailers in the case of DVDs, but not necessarily in the case of videotapes.
Elasticity of Supply
Given how changes in copyright law affect the expected returns to creative activity, the next In a sample of 18 countries, Png and Wang (2006) found that the extensions were associated with a 1.80% (± 1.77%) to 12.7% (± 5.82%) increase in movie production. An especially compelling result was that the increase in production was higher in countries with lower rates of piracy. The findings were robust to various specifications, including controlling for changes in government funding of movie production. These results suggest that even small increases in creators' earnings can induce substantial increases in movie production.
Separately, Baker and Cunningham (2005) studied the impact of changes in copyright law (both statutory and case-law) on applications for copyright registration. They found that increases in copyright protection were associated with a small positive effect on applications.
In future work, it is important to drill deeper into the incentive effect of copyright 
Concluding Remarks
I have reviewed various strands of empirical research into copyright law. Clearly, much more work needs to be done. Above, I have pointed to various directions for future work.
Here, I will highlight three others. Second, we need research into the costs of tracing, transactions, and enforcement involved in the administration of copyright. The magnitude of these costs is crucial to the question of whether copyright should be for fixed term or indefinite (Landes and Posner 2003) . In particular, it would be interesting to measure the contribution of collecting societies towards reducing the costs of copyright administration. A study of U.K. copyright cases suggests that bigger companies are relatively more involved in copyright litigation (Mazeh and Rogers 2005) . However, is this because of fixed costs of copyright litigation or because bigger companies have more copyrights to enforce?
Third, we need empirical research into the different impact of copyright law on the various categories of creative work. For instance, Landes and Posner (1989) observe that the possible range of popular songs is more limited than of other creative work, and so, support stronger copyright protection for song-writers. To support such differentiation in copyright law, it is necessary to have the appropriate empirical justification.
